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Abstract. Animal behavior and evolution can often be described by game-theoretic models.
Although in many situations, the number of players is very large, their strategic interactions
are usually decomposed into a sum of two-player games. Only recently evolutionarily stable
strategies were defined for multi-player games and their properties analyzed (Broom et al.,
1997). Here we study the long-run behavior of stochastic dynamics of populations of randomly
matched individuals playing symmetric three-player games. We analyze stochastic stability of
equilibria in games with multiple evolutionarily stable strategies. We also show that in some
games, a population may not evolve in the long run to an evolutionarily stable equilibrium.
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1 Introduction
Long-run behavior of interacting individuals can often be described within game-theoretic mod-
els. The basic notion here is that of a Nash equilibrium. This is a state of a population - an
assignment of strategies to players - such that no player, for fixed strategies of his opponents,
has an incentive to deviate from his current strategy; the change cannot increase his payoff.
Maynard Smith and Price (1973) have refined this concept of equilibrium to include the stability
of Nash equilibria against mutants (see also Maynard Smith, 1982). They introduced the fun-
damental notion of an evolutionarily stable strategy. If everybody plays such a strategy, then
the small number of mutants playing a different strategy is eliminated from the population.
Although in many models, the number of players is very large, their strategic interactions
are usually decomposed into a sum of two-player games. However, truly multi-player games
naturally appear in many situations. For example, in the stag-hunt game, there are n players
who choose simultaneously one of two actions: either join the stag hunt (strategy S) or go after
a hare (strategy H). The strategy H yields a safe but low fixed payoff. The strategy S gives
the higher payoff if at least k players join the stag hunt and split the reward. The game has two
Nash equilibria: the efficient one, where all players choose S and the one in which players are
averse to risks and play H . This is a typical situation with a selection problem. The long-run
outcome of such games is the subject of this paper. In particular, we will show that in the
stag-hunt game, strategy S is played with a high frequency in the adaptive dynamics in the
presence of mutations.
Recently there have appeared some systematic studies of truly multi-player games. Broom
et al. (1997) defined evolutionarily stable strategies for multi-player games and analyzed their
properties. Kim (1996) investigated an asymptotic and stochastic stability of Nash equilibria
in multi-player games.
Bukowski and Mie¸kisz (2004) provided a classification of symmetric three-player games with
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two strategies. For certain payoff parameters, such games have multiple evolutionarily stable
strategies. In one class of three-player games, there are two pure evolutionarily stable strategies
like in the stag-hunt game. In another class, we have one pure and one mixed evolutionarily
stable strategy. In both cases we are faced with a standard problem of equilibrium selection.
We will approach this problem from a dynamical point of view.
The dynamical interpretation of the evolutionarily stable strategy was provided by several
authors (Taylor and Jonker, 1978; Hofbauer et al., 1979; Zeeman, 1981). They proposed a sys-
tem of differential or difference equations, the so-called replicator equations, which describe the
time-evolution of frequencies of strategies. It is known that any evolutionarily stable strategy
is an asymptotically stable stationary point of such dynamics (Weibull, 1995; Hofbauer and
Sigmund, 1998 and 2003).
Here we discuss a discrete-time stochastic adaptation dynamics of a population of a fixed
number of individuals playing three-player games with two strategies. The selection part of
the dynamics ensures that if the mean payoff of a given strategy at the time t is bigger than
the mean payoff of the other one, then the number of individuals playing the given strategy
should increase in t+1. We assume that individuals are randomly matched with their opponents.
Such model was introduced and analyzed for the case of two-player games by Robson and Vega-
Redondo (1996a, 1996b). Alternatively, if the rate of playing games is much bigger than the rate
of adaptation, then one may assume (as in the standard replicator dymanics) that individuals
receive average payoffs with respect to all possible opponents - they play against the average
strategy (Kandori et al., 1993). In both models, players may mutate with a small probability
hence the population may move against a selection pressure. To describe the long-run behavior
of stochastic dynamics, Foster and Young (1990) introduced a concept of stochastic stability.
A configuration of a system (a number of players playing the first strategy in our models) is
stochastically stable if it has a positive probability in the stationary state of the dynamics
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in the limit of no mutations. It means that in the long run we observe it with a positive
frequency. In the Kandori-Mailath-Rob model, the risk-dominant strategy (the one which has
a higher expected payoff against a player playing both strategies with equal probabilities) is
stochastically stable - if the mutation level is sufficiently small, we observe it in the long run with
the frequency close to one. In the model of Robson and Vega-Redondo, the payoff-dominant
strategy (also called efficient) is stochastically stable. It is one of very few models in which a
payoff-dominant strategy is stochastically stable in the presence of a risk-dominant one.
Here we analyze the model of Robson and Vega-Redondo in the case of symmetric three-
player games. We characterize stochastic stability of equilibria in all generic classes of such
games. In particular, in games with multiple evolutionarily stable strategies we show that only
one is stochastically stable and therefore we resolve the problem of equilibrium selection. We
show that stochastic stability may depend on the number of players. We also show that in some
games, a population may not evolve in the long run to an evolutionarily stable equilibrium.
In Section 2, we introduce three-player games. In Section 3, we discuss adaptive dynamics
with random matching of players. Results are presented in Section 4. Discussion follows in
Section 5. In Appendix A, we present a tree representation of stationary states of irreducible
Markov chains. Some more technical proofs are given in Appendix B.
2 Three-player games
To characterize a game-theoretic model, one has to specify the set of players, strategies they
have at their disposal and payoffs they receive. The payoff of any player depends not only on his
strategy but also on strategies played by his opponents. We will discuss symmetric three-player
games with two strategies. In symmetric games, all players assume the same role in the game.
It is enough therefore to specify payoffs of one player. It is given by two matrices:
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U =
((
u111 u121
u211 u221
)
,
(
u112 u122
u212 u222
))
, (1)
where uijk, i, j, k = A,B is a payoff of the first (row) player when he plays the strategy i
when the second (column) player plays the strategy j, and the third (matrix) player plays k.
For example, if we assume that in the three-player stag-hunt game, a stag is worth, say, 6
units and a hare 1 unit and one needs all three hunters to get a stag and share a reward, then
the payoffs are given by
U1 =
((
2 0
1 1
)(
0 0
1 1
))
(2)
In general we assume that the payoff of any player depends only on his strategy and numbers
of players playing different types of strategies. We consider the following payoffs:
U2 =
((
a1 b1
a2 b2
)(
b1 c1
b2 c2
))
(3)
Let a = a1 − a2, b = b2 − b1, and c = c2 − c1. We will discuss all three classes of generic
symmetric three-player games; see (Bukowski and Mie¸kisz, 2004) for the complete classification.
In the first class, we have a > 0 and c > 0 and therefore two evolutionarily stable strategies:
A and B.
A mixed strategy is a probability distribution on the set of pure strategies. It can be
represented by x, 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, that is a probability of playing the first strategy A. The payoffs
of A and B against x are given by the expected values, a1x
2 + 2b1x(1 − x) + c1(1 − x)
2 and
a2x
2+2b2x(1−x)+c2(1−x)
2 respectively. Any x∗ for which the above two expected values are
equal is a mixed Nash equilibrium. x∗ can also be interpreted as a fraction of the population
playing the first strategy in equilibrium.
In the first class of games, in addition to two pure Nash equilibria, there exists also an
unstable mixed Nash equilibrium, x∗ = (b−c)+
√
b2+ac
a+2b−c if b 6= (c− a)/2 and x
∗ = c
a+c
otherwise.
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In our second class of games, we have a > 0 and c < 0 (analogous results hold for a < 0 < c).
Then A is the only pure evolutionarily stable strategy. If b >
√
|ac|, then we have in addition a
mixed evolutionarily stable strategy, y∗ = (b−c)−
√
b2+ac
a+2b−c , and an unstable mixed Nash equilibrium
x∗.
In the third class of games, a < 0 and c < 0 and there is a unique mixed evolutionarily
stable strategy x∗.
Below we study stability of above evolutionarily stable strategies in adaptive stochastic
dynamics with random matching of players.
3 Adaptive dynamics with random matching of players
We consider a finite population of n individuals who have at their disposal one of two strategies:
A and B. They are randomly matched in triples (we assume that n is divisible by 3) to play a
three-player symmetric game with payoffs given by U2.
At every discrete moment of time, t = 1, 2, ..., the state of the population is described
by the number of individuals, zt, playing A. Formally, by the state space we mean the set
Ω = {z, 0 ≤ z ≤ n}. Due to the random nature of matching, average payoffs of strategies
depend on the realization of two random variables: pt - the number of triples in which there
are exactly two A-players and qt - the number of triples with exactly one A-player. It follows
that zt−2pt−qt
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is the number of triples, where all individuals play the first strategy.
Now we will describe the dynamics of our system. It consists of two components: selection
and mutation. The selection mechanism ensures that if the average payoff of a given strategy,
πi(zt, pt, qt), i = A,B, at the time t, is bigger than the average payoff of the other one, then the
number of individuals playing the given strategy should increase in t + 1. We assume that at
any time period, each individual has a revision opportunity with a small positive probability τ .
Average payoffs are given by following expressions:
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πA(zt, pt, qt) =
a1(zt − 2pt − qt) + 2b1pt + c1qt
zt
, (4)
πB(zt, pt, qt) =
a2pt + 2b2qt + c2(n− zt − pt − 2qt)
(n− zt)
,
provided 0 < zt < n.
The selection dynamics is formalized in the following way:
zt+1 > zt if πA(zt, pt, qt) > πB(zt, pt, qt), (5)
zt+1 < zt if πA(zt, pt, qt) < πB(zt, pt, qt),
zt+1 = zt if πA(zt, pt, qt) = πB(zt, pt, qt),
zt+1 = zt if zt = 0 or zt = n.
Now mutations are added. At every time period, each player who has a revision opportunity,
instead of following the selection rule may adopt the other strategy with a small probability ǫ.
It is easy to see, that for any two states of the population, there is a positive probability of the
transition between them in some finite number of time steps. We have therefore obtained an
irreducible Markov chain with n+1 states. It has a unique stationary state (a probability mass
function) which we denote by µǫn. For any z ∈ Ω, µ
ǫ
n(z) is the frequency of visiting the state z
in the long run. The following definition was first introduced by Foster and Young (1990).
Definition z ∈ Ω is stochastically stable if limǫ→0 µ
ǫ
n(z) > 0.
In most cases below, there exists a state for which the above limit is actually equal to 1. In
particular, unless we explicitly desribe the situation, if z = n (z = 0) is stochastically stable,
then in the long run, in the limit of no mutations, all individuals play the strategy A (B). We
also say that respective strategies are stochastically stable.
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4 Stochastic stability of evolutionarily stable strategies
We study here the stability of evolutionarily stable strategies of three-player games in described
above adaptive stochastic dynamics with random matching of players. We present our results
and give some proofs. All remaining proofs are given in Appendix B. They are based on
a certain tree representation of stationary states of irreducible Markov chains (Freidlin and
Wentzell, 1970 and 1984; see Appendix A). We assume that at any time period, each individual
has a revision opportunity with a small positive probability τ . It follows that z = 0 and z = n
are the only absorbing states. After a finite number of steps of the mutation-free dynamics we
arrive at one of these two states and stay there forever - there are no other recurrence classes.
Therefore to obtain a stationary state in the limit of no mutations, it is enough to count a
number of mutations the population needs to evolve between these states. If one requires for
example fewer mutations to evolve from z = 0 to z = n than from z = n to z = o, then z = n
is stochastically stable. This means that in the long run, if the mutation level is sufficiently
low, then almost all individuals play A.
For games in the first class, without a loss of generality, we assume that a1 > c2. Under an
additional condition, we have the following theorem (a proof is given in Appendix B).
Theorem 1 If a, c > 0, a1 > b2, c2, and n is sufficiently big, then A is stochastically stable.
In particular, we see that in the stag-hunt game with payoffs given by U1, the strategy S is
stochastically stable if the number of players is sufficiently large. Observe that for the stag-hunt
game with just three players, one needs three mutations to evolve from z = 0 to z = 3 and only
one mutation to evolve from z = 3 to z = 0, hence H is stochastically stable. We see that the
stochastic stability depends on the number of players.
In general, we have the following theorem.
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Theorem 2 If a, c > 0, a1 > c2, b1 < c2, and (a1(n − 3) + c1)/(n − 2) < b2 < a1, then B is
stochastically stable.
Proof: We have that πB(z = 1) > πA(z = 1) and πB(z = n−1) < πA(z = n−1) for sufficiently
big n. For z = n − 2, if two B-players are matched with one A-player, then πB > πA and for
z = 2, for two possible matchings πB > πA. Hence the population needs only two mutations to
evolve from z = n to z = 0 and three mutations to evolve from z = 0 to z = n. It follows from
the tree representation of stationary states (see Appendix A) that B is stochastically stable. ✷
It follows from Theorem 2 that if b2 < a1 and n < n
∗ = (3a1 − 2b2 − c1)/(a1 − b2), then B
is stochastically stable. Observe that n∗ can be arbitrarily big. However, Theorem 1 tells us
that A is stochastically stable if n is big enough. We see that when n increases, the population
undergoes a transition between its equilibria.
Let us discuss now the case a1 < b2. If b1 < c2, then we may repeat the proof of Theorem
2 and obtain
Theorem 3 If a, c > 0, a1 > c2, a1 < b2, and b1 < c2, then B is stochastically stable if n is
sufficiently big.
If b1 > c2, then the population needs two mutations to evolve both from z = n to z = 0 and
from z = 0 to z = n. We get the following theorem.
Theorem 4 If a, c > 0, a1 > c2, a1 < b2, and b1 > c2, then both A and B are stochastically
stable if n is sufficiently big.
In games in the second class, the only pure evolutionarily stable strategy is stochastically
stable. Without a loss of generality, we assume that a > 0 and c < 0 and have the following
theorem.
Theorem 5 If c < 0 < a and n is sufficiently big, then A is stochastically stable.
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Proof: It is easy to see that for a big n, the population needs one mutation to evolve from
z = 0 to z = n and at least two mutations to evolve from z = n to z = 0. ✷
However, we observe that for a fixed n, if a1 < c2, b1 is sufficiently small (negative and big
in the absolute value) and b2 is sufficiently big, then πB(z) > πA(z) for any z 6= 0, n and all
matchings. It follows that for such payoffs, B is stochastically stable.
We will now show that for certain payoffs, although both A and B are stochastically stable,
for a fixed and sufficiently small ǫ, almost 2/3 of the population will play B if τ is sufficiently
small, that is when our dynamics is a small perturbation of the sequential one. The reason is
that for small τ , the probability that many players adapt at the same time period is rather
small - for k players it is of order τk and moreover to evolve from z = 0 to z = n, the population
must pass through a large region of z′s, including {z, n/3 ≤ z ≤ 2n/3}, where πB(z) > πA(z)
for any matching.
Theorem 6 If c < 0 < a, a1 < c2, b1 < a2, b2 > c1, and n is sufficiently big, then for
every δ > 0 and a sufficiently small ǫ there exists τ(δ, ǫ, n) such that if τ < τ(δ, ǫ, n), then
µǫ,τn (z, z ≤ n/3) > 1− δ.
The proof is provided in Appendix B.
Finally we discuss the case a < 0 and c < 0.
Theorem 7 If a, c < 0 and n is sufficiently big, then both A and B are stochastically stable.
Proof: It is easy to see that for a big n, the population needs one mutation to evolve from
z = 0 to z = n or from z = n to z = 0.
As in the previous case, for a fixed n, if a1 < c2, b1 is sufficiently small and b2 is sufficiently
big, then πB(z) > πA(z) for any z 6= 0, n and any matching, and therefore B is stochastically
stable.
We also have the similar theorem concerning small τ .
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Theorem 8 If a, c < 0, a1 < c2, b1 < c2, b2 > a1, and n is sufficiently big, then for every δ > 0
and sufficiently small τ there exists ǫ(δ, τ, n) such that if ǫ < ǫ(δ, τ, n), then µǫ,τn (0) > 1− δ.
For a proof see Appendix B.
5 Discussion
Multi-player games naturally appear in many situations (see Broom et al., 1997, for a list of
biological examples involving leks and communal nests). Here we discussed stochastic adaptive
dynamics of populations of individuals playing three-player games. We assumed that players
are matched with randomly chosen opponents.
We considered all three classes of generic symmetric three-player games with two strategies.
In the first class, there are two pure evolutionarily stable strategies. We showed that only one
is stochastically stable and therefore we resolved the problem of equilibrium selection. We also
showed that the stochastic stability may depend on the number of players. For some payoff
parameters, when the number of players increases, the population may undergo a transition
between its equilibria.
In the second class of games, the unique pure evolutionarily stable strategy is also stochasti-
cally stable. However, for a fixed low level of mutation, when one considers very small probabil-
ity of adaptation (when our dynamics is very close to a sequential one), then for certain payoff
parameters, almost 2/3 of all individuals will play in the long run the strategy which provides
the higher payoff in the homogeneous population, although it is not evolutionarily stable.
In the third class of games, both strategies are stochastically stable but they are not evolu-
tionarily stable. This is a consequence of the fact that they are the only absorbing states and
we take the limit of no mutations for a fixed number of players. If we first take the limit of
an infinite number of players and then the limit of no mutations, then the long behavior may
be different; see (Samuelson, 1997) for a discussion on the order of taking different limits in
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evolutionary models.
In our models we assumed that individuals are matched completely randomly. We may
allow some clustering in the population, either of geographic nature or following for example
from the fact that A-players are more likely to meet other A-players. However, if any matching
has a positive probability to occur, then our results will not change qualitatively. This is
a consequence of taking a limit of no mutations for a fixed number of players. Stochastic
stability of spatial three-player games with local interactions was studied in (Mie¸kisz, 2004).
The stochastic stability concept involves the limit of no mutations for a fixed number of
players. However, for any arbitrarily low level of mutations, when the number of players is
sufficiently big, then the long-run behavior of a population might be different. In fact, it was
shown (Mie¸kisz, 2005) that in the case of two-player games with two strategies, in the limit
of the infinite number of players in the random matching model, the long run behavior of the
population is similar to the one in the Kandori-Mailath-Rob model (Kandori et al., 1993). The
assumption of the infinite number of players has the same effect as the limit of infinitely many
matchings per time period. The second limit can be justified if the rate of playing games is
much bigger than the rate of adaptation. We expect the same situation in the case of three-
player games. The stochastic stability in multi-player games in the limit of infinitely many
matchings per time period was investigated by Kim (1996).
In order to study the long-run behavior of stochastic population dynamics, we should esti-
mate the relevant parameters to be sure what limiting procedures are appropriate in specific
biological examples.
Acknowledgments JM would like to thank the Polish Committee for Scientific Research for
a financial support under the grant KBN 5 P03A 025 20.
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Appendix A
The following tree representation of stationary distributions of Markov chains was proposed by
Freidlin and Wentzell (1970, 1984). Let (Ω, P ) be an irreducible Markov chain with a state
space Ω and transition probabilities given by P ǫ : Ω × Ω → [0, 1]. It has a unique stationary
distribution, µǫ, also called a stationary state. For X ∈ Ω, let an X-tree be a directed graph on
Ω such that from every Y 6= X there is a unique path to X and there are no outcoming edges
out of X . Denote by T (X) the set of all X-trees and let
qǫ(X) =
∑
d∈T (X)
∏
(Y,Y ′)∈d
P ǫ(Y, Y ′), (6)
where the product is with respect to all edges of d. We have that
µǫ(X) =
qǫ(X)∑
Y ∈Ω qǫ(Y )
(7)
for all X ∈ Ω.
Let us assume now that after a finite number of steps of the mutation-free dynamics, i.e.
ǫ = 0, we arrive at one of two absorbing states, say X and Y , and stay there forever - there
are no other recurrence classes. It follows from the tree representation that any state different
from absorbing states has zero probability in the stationary distribution in the zero-mutation
limit. Consider a dynamics in which P ǫ(Z,W ) for all Z,W ∈ Ω, is of order ǫm, where m is the
number of mutations involved to pass from Z to W or is zero. Then one has to compute the
minimal number of mutations, mXY , needed to make a transition from the state X to Y and
the number of mutations, mY X , to evolve from Y to X . q(X) is of order ǫ
m(Y X) and q(Y ) is
of order ǫm(XY ). It follows that if mXY < mY X , then Y is stochastically stable and moreover
limǫ→0 µ
ǫ(Y ) = 1.
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Appendix B
Proof of Theorem 1:
We begin by examining in detail the mutation-free dynamics. First we show that if a, c > 0,
then z = 0 and z = n are the only absorbing states (for a sufficiently big n) of the mutation-free
dynamics even in the sequential dynamics, i.e. when at any time period only one randomly
chosen player can adapt to the environment. Let UA and UB be the basins of attraction of z = n
and z = 0 respectively. Let us emphasize that because of the stochastic nature of matchings,
they overlap substantially. Observe first that there exists k∗ such that if k ≥ k∗, then k ∈ UA.
If k is divisible by 3 and all A-players and B-players are matched within themselves, then
πA > πB. If k = 3m+1 for some natural number m, then let two pairs of A-players be matched
with B-players; if k = 3m+ 2, then let two A-players be matched with one B-player. In both
cases, all other A-players are matched within themselves. Now for a sufficiently big k∗ we have
a1(k
∗ − 4)/k∗ > a2 (8)
and therefore the inequality πA > πB. Let us observe that for any z < k
∗ and n big enough, if
all A-players are matched with two B-players, then πA < πB.We have shown that UA∪UB = Ω.
Moreover, there are no other recurrence classes.
Assume now, without a loss of generality, that all payoffs are positive. Let us notice that
for z = n− k∗, if
a1(n− 2k
∗)/(n− k∗) > max{a2, b2, c2} ≡ f (9)
which is true if
n > k∗(2a1 − f)/(a1 − f), (10)
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then πA > πB for any matching. It follows that the size of UB is at most n− k
∗− 1 and that of
UA at least n− k
∗. Hence the population needs at least k∗ + 1 mutations to evolve from z = n
to z = 0 and at most k∗ mutations to evolve from z = 0 to z = n. It follows from the tree
representation of stationary states (see Appendix A) that z = n is stochastically stable.
Proof of Theorem 6:
For every z = k with k divisible by 3, if all B-players are matched within themselves, then
πB > πA and therefore the number of B-players increases in the mutation-free dynamics. It is
also true if k is not too small and not too big (independent of n) and only one or two B-players
are matched with A-players. We have that πB(z = 1) < πA(z = 1) and πB(z = n−1) < πA(z =
n − 1). However, for other small and big k′s (depending on n), there is a positive probability
that πB(z = k) > πA(z = k). Note that from the assumptions of the theorem follows that
b1 < a2, b2, c2 and b2 > a1, b1, c1. Therefore it is enough that all A-players are matched with
one B-player and one A-player for small k′s and all B-players are matched with one A-player
and one B-player for big k′s. We get that there is a positive probability that πB(z) > πA(z) if
z 6= 0, 1, n− 1, n.
If k = n/2 and there are the same number of triples with two A-players and one B-player
and two B-players and one A-player, then πB > πA because 2b1+ c1 < a2+2b2. One may check
that the same conclusion follows if 2n/3 or more individuals are matched in this way and the
rest are either A or B-players matched within themselves. If k = n/3 and all A-players are
matched with two B-players or if k = 2n/3 and all B-players are matched with two A-players
then again πB > πA. It follows that if z = k and n/3 ≤ k ≤ 2n/3, then πB > πA for all possible
matchings.
Now for a sufficiently small τ , one considers only trees of order τn, where at any time
period, only one randomly chosen individual may adapt to the invironment - our dynamics is
then a small perturbation of the sequential one. Among these trees there are (z = k)-trees with
15
0 ≤ k ≤ n/3 which are of order ǫ2. Observe that {z ∈ Ω, z = k, 0 < k < n/3} is a recurrence
class for the sequential dynamics. The thesis follows for sufficiently small ǫ and τ .
Proof of Theorem 8:
Again, as in the previous case, if k is not too small and not too large (independent of n),
then there is a positive probability that πB(z = k) > πA(z = k) for any matching. It is easy
to see that if b2 > a1, then πB(z) > πA(z) for all matchings if z = k and k is sufficiently big;
k > αn for some α > 0. If c2 > b1, then there is a positive probability that πB(z) > πA(z) for
small z 6= 0, 1 z = k, k < βn for some β > 0. It follows that there is a positive probability that
πB(z) > πA(z) for any z 6= 0, 1, n.
Now for a sufficiently small ǫ, one considers only (z = 0)-trees with just one mutation.
Among these trees there is one which is of order τn+2. In this tree, the number of individuals
playing A decreases by one, from z = n until z = 3, then it jumps to z = 1, then it increases
to z = 2, and finally it jumps down to z = 0. Such tree, for a sufficiently small τ , is the main
contribution to q(z = 0). All (z = n)-trees with just one mutation are of order at least τn(1+α).
The thesis follows for sufficiently small τ and ǫ.
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